The code spoke, but the logic was a lie. On March 14, 2025, Zengyi Qin, a member of Meta’s Superintelligence Lab and core contributor to Muse Spark, publicly dismissed China’s open-source models. His claim was simple: Meta has an order of magnitude more computing power and better data. Muse Spark will eventually surpass Chinese models like Kimi. He extended this to the business level: major US clients like JPMorgan would switch to American open models due to compliance, cutting off Chinese labs’ inference revenue. Meta earns through Facebook and Instagram, while Chinese model companies rely more heavily on model revenue. The comment section reacted with skepticism. Meta has not lacked computing power for two years, so why hasn’t it suppressed Chinese models? Others asked exactly how much revenue JPMorgan contributes to Kimi. Some sarcastically remarked that if this is the reasoning level of a “Muse Spark core member,” they are starting to worry about Muse’s model performance. Muse Spark 1.2 is about to open its weights, adding another heavyweight American competitor to Kimi, DeepSeek, and Qwen. But jumping from “one more formidable rival” to “Chinese models will be crushed by computing power and US revenue will be lost” is a leap engineered on faulty assumptions.
This is not a new narrative. It is the same playbook used by crypto maximalists who claimed Bitcoin would be crushed by regulated ETF custodians. They built a palace on a fault line. The fault line is the assumption that computing power parity equals market dominance. In the decentralized world of open-source AI, computation is a commodity. The real variable is trust, and trust is a variable you cannot hardcode.
Context: The current landscape of large language models is a battlefield of open-source releases. China’s Kimi, DeepSeek, Qwen, and others have demonstrated competitive performance against Meta’s LLaMA series and now Muse Spark. Muse Spark 1.2, soon to open its weights, represents Meta’s latest attempt to reclaim the open-source AI crown. The hype cycle is predictable: a new model releases, benchmarks are touted, and the narrative shifts to “US vs. China.” But the underlying economics tell a different story. Chinese model companies like Kimi generate revenue from inference services, not just model sales. They are integrated into China’s massive domestic tech ecosystem, similar to how Meta’s revenue comes from advertising on Facebook and Instagram. The claim that US clients will abandon Chinese models due to compliance overlooks the fact that many of these clients already use Chinese models through local partners or APIs. The compliance argument itself is a straw man.
Core: Let’s deconstruct the computing power argument using first-principles economic logic. Meta’s advantage is real: they have access to massive GPU clusters, proprietary data, and a war chest of capital. But computing power is a static input, not a dynamic competitive advantage. In the AI model market, the marginal cost of inference is dropping rapidly due to hardware improvements and efficient architectures. The “order of magnitude” advantage Qin cites is a snapshot, not a durable moat. Open-source models benefit from network effects: the more developers fine-tune, deploy, and optimize them, the better they become. Chinese models have a massive user base in Asia, and their training data includes languages and cultural contexts that Meta’s English-centric models struggle to replicate. This is not a zero-sum game. The US market for AI inference is large, but it is not the entire market. Even if JPMorgan switches to Meta’s Muse Spark, the revenue loss for Kimi is a fraction of their total business. The more critical flaw is the assumption that compliance is a binary switch. Large financial institutions like JPMorgan already use multiple AI models from different vendors to avoid vendor lock-in. They will not abandon Chinese models entirely; they will diversify. Trust is a variable you cannot hardcode, but you can spread it.
Based on my experience auditing AI-agent protocols in 2025, I uncovered a similar pattern. A protocol claimed to have superior computing power for its oracle validation, but the centralized fault proofs rendered the entire system brittle. The computing power was irrelevant if the architecture was flawed. The same applies here. Qin’s argument ignores the structural decentralization of the AI open-source ecosystem. Development is not confined to Meta’s labs. Chinese researchers, academics, and independent developers contribute to the global pool of open-source models. The innovation rate is not a linear function of computing power. It is a function of the number of experiments run, the diversity of training data, and the alignment of incentives. Meta’s computing power is a single point of failure. If Meta decides to change the license of Muse Spark, as they did with LLaMA, the community will fork. Chinese models, by contrast, are often released under permissive licenses like Apache 2.0, ensuring long-term availability. The open-source ethos is a self-correcting mechanism. Data does not lie, but it does not care about Meta’s quarterly earnings.
But let’s look at the business side. Qin claims that Meta earns through Facebook and Instagram, while Chinese model companies rely more heavily on model revenue. This is a straw man. Chinese model companies have diversified revenue streams: cloud computing services, enterprise AI solutions, and government contracts. Kimi’s revenue from inference is a part of a larger portfolio. Moreover, the US market is not homogeneous. Many US startups and enterprises prefer open-source models for transparency and control. They will not blindly switch to Meta’s model just because it has more computing power. The decision metric is performance, cost, and trust. On all three, Chinese models have demonstrated competitive parity. DeepSeek’s recent benchmark results rival Muse Spark on several coding and reasoning tasks. The margin is thin. The computing power advantage is not translating into a decisive performance lead.
Contrarian: What did the bulls get right? The computing power advantage is real, and it does give Meta a faster iteration cycle. Muse Spark 1.2 may indeed outperform Kimi on some benchmarks. The compliance argument is not entirely wrong; some US financial institutions will prefer models hosted in the US under US jurisdiction. But the assumption that this leads to “crushing” Chinese models is a failure of imagination. The open-source ecosystem is not a winner-take-all market. It is a fragmented landscape where multiple models coexist. The US market is large, but the global market for AI is larger. Chinese models have a stronghold in Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe. The computing power differential is a temporary advantage, not a permanent moat. What the bulls miss is the adaptive resilience of the Chinese AI ecosystem. They faced export controls on advanced GPUs, yet they developed alternative architectures and software optimizations. They are building a parallel infrastructure. The palace of computing power is built on a fault line of geopolitical risk. If US export controls tighten further, Meta’s advantage may become a liability, as they cannot access the vast Chinese market. Trust is a variable you cannot hardcode, but you can lose it through hubris.
Takeaway: The narrative that computing power will crush Chinese open-source models is a relic of a centralized worldview. It is the same logic that led to the collapse of FTX: an assumption that size and capital insulate you from structural flaws. The reality is that open-source AI is a decentralized, permissionless innovation space. The winners will not be the ones with the most GPUs, but the ones with the most trust. Meta’s Muse Spark may be a formidable competitor, but it is not a death blow. The Chinese model ecosystem will continue to evolve, adapt, and compete. The real question is not whether JPMorgan will switch to Meta, but whether the open-source community will continue to value diversity over monoculture. The code spoke, but the logic was a lie. The truth is that computing power is a tool, not a destiny. They built a palace on a fault line, and the fault line is the assumption that the market converges to a single point. It does not. It diverges.

